SI Materials and Methods:
Proportional navigation can produce the geometries of parallel navigation and pursuit. In the two-dimensional (2D) case, proportional navigation (PN) commands turning at a rate proportional to the line-of-sight rate :
( ) = ( ) (S1) where the constant is called the navigation constant. To see the functional significance of this guidance law in relation to the three geometric rules defined in the main text, we may integrate between limits of = 0 and = , and solve for the line-of-sight angle to yield:
(S2) It is clear by inspection that when is very large, the fraction on the righthand side of Eq. S2 is very small, so that ≈ 0 . This is the geometric rule defining parallel navigation, which shows that PN tends to produce a parallel navigation course at large .
At the other extreme, setting = 1, we may rewrite Eq. S2 as − = 0 − (0). Making use of the fact that the deviation angle is defined as ≝ − , where is the track angle of the attacker's velocity vector, it follows that = (0). This corresponds to the geometric rule describing pure pursuit if 0 = 0, and to the geometric rule describing deviated pursuit if 0 > 0. Hence, in the ideal error-free case, PN with = 1 will produce either a pure or deviated pursuit course, according to the initial deviation angle (0). It is important to note that this does not imply that PN guidance with = 1 is directly equivalent to proportional pursuit (PP) guidance implementing pure pursuit according to the equation: = − ( ) (S3) or even to its generalization to the case of deviated pursuit: = − − (S4) where is the intended (non-zero) lead angle. This is because Eqs. S3 and S4 both tend to drive the deviation angle to a specific angle (such that ( ) → 0 or ), whereas Eq. S1 tends only to hold unchanging with = 1 (such that = 0 in the absence of error or delay).
GPS error analysis.
The accuracy of a GPS position estimate refers to its closeness to the true position of the receiver within the WGS84 world geodetic system of coordinates, as distinct from the precision of the estimate, which refers only to its repeatability (1) . The accuracy of a GPS position estimate is usually worse in the vertical than the horizontal, depending on the arrangement of the GPS satellite constellation and the orientation of the receiver's antenna. The stated horizontal accuracy of our GPS units (< 3 m circular error probable) indicates that a circle of radius 3 m centered on the true position of the receiver would contain at least 50% of all position estimates. However, most of the inaccuracy in any GPS position estimate is due to receiver clock errors that introduce a slowly varying bias into the position estimates (1) , which has little impact on the precision with which it is possible to measure changes in position between successive sample points. Consequently, the precision of a GPS unit can be expected to be much better than its accuracy over short time scales. As a simple demonstration of this point, Fig. S5A plots a sequence of position estimates from a Qstarz BT-Q1300 GPS receiver unit that we attached to the rim of a 0.35 m radius bicycle wheel that was spun horizontally through 20 revolutions over approximately 60 s. Although the measured trajectory drifted by approximately ± 0.5 m over 60 s, the circular form of the wheel is apparent in any given sequence of position estimates through a single 3 s revolution. It follows that the precision of our GPS units is at least an order of magnitude better than their stated accuracy over the timescales that interest us here. Fundamentally, it is the precision of the position estimates which matters from the perspective of our trajectory analysis, and whilst their positional accuracy could be important when relating position estimates from two different units, the fact that the true positions of the target and attacker are known to coincide at the point of contact allows us to eliminate any difference in the systematic error between receivers at the time of interception. The following error analysis is therefore aimed at quantifying the precision of the Qstarz BT-Q1300 GPS receiver units that we used, over a characteristic timescale of 10 s. We first characterized the precision of the GPS units when stationary on the ground. After leaving two receivers to settle for 5 minutes whilst logging, we sampled 200 consecutive 10 s blocks of data from each unit (Fig. S5B ). For each 10 s block of data, we calculated the horizontal distance of each of the position estimates from the mean for that block. The median horizontal distance deviation over all 400 blocks was 0.01 m, which is representative of the precision of our GPS devices when stationary. This almost certainly overstates their precision during unsteady motion, however, because GPS position estimates are necessarily obtained with the aid of a Kalman filter tuned to the dynamics of conventional use cases (1). We used our GPS units in their 5 Hz "sports" mode, which is tuned for use in fast activities involving high accelerations (up to 515 ms -1 speed, and up to 4 acceleration).
To quantify the precision of our units during unsteady motions, we fixed a GPS unit to a playground roundabout on a radius of 1.75 m, left it to settle for 5 minutes, then rotated the roundabout through 60 revolutions at an angular velocity steadily increasing to a maximum of 90˚s -1 (Fig. S5B ). The receiver unit was mounted with its patch antenna in the default horizontal orientation. We split the data into 45 consecutive 10 s blocks, and used a nonlinear least squares solver to estimate the center of rotation for each 10 s block. We then calculated the radial distance of each of the position estimates from the center of rotation for that block, which we expressed as an absolute deviation from the expected radius. The median radial distance deviation of 0.07 m over all 45 blocks is broadly representative of the scale of the relative positioning error during unsteady motion, and although it is clear from Fig. S5C that the precision of the position estimates was better at lower angular velocities, we found that 99% of all position estimates in the stationary tests and 84% of all position estimates in the unsteady tests had a horizontal or radial distance deviation ≤ 0.20 m. We next investigated how the measurement precision was affected by the orientation of the GPS patch antenna, with the aim of simulating the changes in orientation experienced during a banked turn. We fixed three GPS units to another playground roundabout on a radius of 1.5m, orienting them horizontally (0˚), obliquely (45˚), or vertically (90˚). We left the units to settle for 5 minutes, then pushed the roundabout steadily through 10 revolutions. We repeated this procedure three times, with each receiver mounted in each of the three orientations. Whereas the circular form of the roundabout was traced with high precision when the GPS unit was mounted with its patch antenna in its default horizontal orientation, the precision progressively worsened at bank angles of 45˚ and 90° (Fig. S6) . This makes sense, because the horizontal precision of a GPS unit should be highest when it samples a constellation of satellites directly overhead, which occurs only when the patch antenna is oriented horizontally (1) .
To summarize, our GPS units have a typical precision of order 0.1 m on the timescales of order 10 s associated with our experiments. This precision varies, however, and we therefore looked for some means of internally validating the precision of our GPS position estimates. In addition to estimating position, the Qstarz BT-Q1300 receivers measure groundspeed using the Doppler shift in the frequency of the carrier signal. This gives a highly accurate groundspeed estimate, with a stated root mean square error < 0.10 ms -1 . As a check on the internal consistency of the GPS data, this Doppler measurement of groundspeed can be compared with the inherently noisier estimate of groundspeed that can be obtained by differencing successive GPS position estimates. Measurement error aside, these two estimates of groundspeed should in principle be the same, given a suitably high GPS sampling rate. The two groundspeed estimates were indeed essentially identical when the GPS units were mounted horizontally on the roundabout (Fig.  S6B ). This internal consistency partly reflects the use of a Kalman filter to optimize the GPS position estimates using the Doppler groundspeed measurements, but nevertheless breaks down when the precision of the position estimates becomes degraded. For example, the two groundspeed estimates were prone to much greater discrepancies when the antenna was inclined at 45˚ or 90˚ to the ground (Fig. S6C-D) , as is to be expected from the degradation in the precision of the position fixes that is already visible in the plotted trajectories (Fig. S6A) . Comparing the Doppler measurement of groundspeed with the groundspeed estimate obtained by differencing successive position estimates therefore provides a useful check on the internal consistency of the data, since any inconsistency implies that the precision of the data is degraded.
GPS quality control.
We used an internal validation method to screen for loss of precision in the GPS data that we collected from the peregrines. We first computed the discrepancy between the groundspeed estimates for every GPS sample point that we had collected, identifying the 95 th percentile for flights against stationary or maneuvering targets over the entire dataset. We then rejected any attack pass for which the number of discrepancies exceeding the 95 th percentile was higher than would be expected by chance under a binomial error model, at a rejection threshold of = 0.05. We also screened subjectively for loss of accuracy by overlaying the GPS tracks on high-resolution satellite imagery referenced to the WGS84 coordinate system (ArcGIS, Esri, Redlands, CA, USA), and comparing this with the corresponding onboard video (Fig. S7) . Most of the tracks either passed or failed on both criteria together, and we determined from the specific pattern of failures that both the accuracy and precision of the GPS measurements were degraded by electromagnetic interference from the camera when the GPS receiver was mounted directly on top of it. We confirmed this conclusion experimentally, and revised the GPS mounting configuration accordingly, but were forced to discard the GPS data from flights with degraded precision -mainly from the 2014 trials against maneuvering targets.
Simulation code. To test whether the measured attack trajectories could have been produced by proportional navigation (PN) or proportional pursuit (PP) guidance, we used Euler's forward method to simulate the trajectory that would have been commanded at a given value of the respective guidance constant or . Our method uses vector quantities, and therefore applies to the 2D and the 3D case alike. The line-of-sight vector ( ) is defined as the measured position of the target ( : ) relative to the simulated position of the attacker ( ; ):
(S5) and the closing velocity = is defined as:
(S6) with : the measured velocity of the target, and ; the simulated velocity of the attacker. It can be shown algebraically (11) that the rotation rate ( ) of the line-of-sight vector (i.e. the line-ofsight rate, fed back by the PN guidance law) is given by:
denotes the length of the vector , and × denotes the vector product. Similarly, the vector deviation angle fed back by the PP guidance law is given by: Under PN guidance, turning is commanded at an angular velocity (cf. Eq. S1 in the 2D case), which we may rewrite in terms of the commanded centripetal acceleration ( ) as:
(S10A) which by the properties of a vector product implies that the acceleration is commanded perpendicular to the attacker's velocity vector ; , and in the plane of rotation of the line-of-sight as defined by its normal vector . This form of PN, in which the acceleration is commanded perpendicular to the attacker's velocity vector, as opposed to perpendicular to the line-of-sight, is termed "pure" PN in the missile literature (12). Alternatively, under PP guidance, turning is commanded at an angular velocity − (cf. Eq. S3 in the 2D case), such that:
(S10B) which implies that the acceleration is again commanded perpendicular to the attacker's velocity vector ; , but in the plane of the deviation angle between ; and the line-of-sight to target, as defined by its normal vector .
In our simulations, the kinematic equations (Eqs. S5-9) are coupled with the PN (Eq. S10A) or PP (Eq. S10B) guidance law by two difference equations: + Δ J (S12) where ; denotes the measured speed of the attacker, and where the subscript notation indicates the values of the variables at successive time steps J and JKG = J + Δ . The effect of Eq. S11 is simply to advance the simulated position of the attacker from ; J to ; JKG using the simulated velocity ; J . On the other hand, Eq. S12 advances the simulated velocity of the attacker from ; J to ; JKG by using the commanded centripetal acceleration J to rotate ; J , but then scales the rotated vector to match the measured speed of the attacker ( ; ). In summary, we used the guidance law to generate all of the changes in the attacker's flight direction, but forced its speed to match what we had measured experimentally. Making the simulated acceleration of the attacker equal to the commanded acceleration (i.e. assuming that the attacker can meet its acceleration demand) is reasonable because any guidance model that fits the empirical data well must necessarily be feasible within the biomechanical constraints on the system. We solved Eqs. S5-12 numerically given knowledge of the attacker's initial position ; N and velocity ; N at the chosen start point N = 0, and given the measured time histories of the attacker's speed ; , and the target's position : and velocity : . We wrote the simulation code in MATLAB (MathWorks Inc., Natick, MA), and used a time-step Δ equal to 1/300 th of the 0.2 s GPS sampling interval. To accommodate this higher update rate, we interpolated the measured position data using quintic splines fitted to the latitude, longitude, and altitude, at a tolerance designed to remove a 0.05 m root mean square error in each dimension. We then differentiated the splines for O and : analytically to determine ; and : at the same update rate. We call these simulations "nominally lag-free" in the main text, and note that they are only nominally so because of: (i) the small delay of order 1ms implicit in the numerical integration scheme, and (ii) the timing uncertainty of order 0.1s implicit in aligning our 5Hz GPS data to the point of capture. To verify the robustness of our simulations to this timing uncertainty, which precludes reliable estimation of any sensorimotor delay, we also re-ran the PN simulations after adding an explicit 0.2s delay (equivalent to one GPS sampling interval) to the line-of-sight rate (Eq. S7) fed back to command turning.
For each attack pass, and from each given start point, we identified the best-fitting value of the respective guidance constant or by minimizing the prediction error of the simulation using a Nelder-Mead simplex algorithm. We defined the prediction error as the mean absolute distance between the simulated ( O ) and measured ( O ) positions of the attacker over the GPS sample points up to the measured point of intercept:
where the factor of 300 in the subscripts relates the sampling rate of the GPS measurements to the update rate of the simulation.
Video analysis. We viewed the onboard video that we had collected to identify any attacks that the birds made on live targets. As the target position was unknown in these cases unless the target landed, we resorted to a simple but robust mode of video analysis undertaken in Illustrator CC (Adobe Systems Inc., San Jose, CA) in lieu of a formal trajectory analysis. Since the displacement of the camera between frames has a negligible effect on the geographic direction of distant background features, these can obviously serve as a reference against which to measure any drift in the line-of-sight. In contrast to the camera-referenced methods adopted in previous research using onboard video (2,3), this background-referenced method is independent of uncertainty and variability in camera orientation, and does not rely upon the extraction of noisy optic-flow features. We extracted all of the video frames in which the target was visible prior to intercept, and picked an arbitrary but distinct point on the horizon to serve as a reference. Having already calibrated the field of view of the cameras, we used this point to center a pair of concentric reference circles whose diameters subtended 6˚ and 10˚ respectively, assuming a distortion-free perspective projection (Fig. 3) . This allowed us to quantify the drift in the line-ofsight as the extent to which the target's position drifted within the concentric reference circles overlain on the video frames. In one case (Fig. 3C) , the target was too far below the horizon for this method of referencing to be tenable, and in this case we centered the reference circles on the intersection of a pair of circular arcs of fixed radius drawn from two reference points on the distant horizon. It is obvious geometrically that the geographic direction of this intersection must be constant, just like the geographic direction of the reference points from which it is drawn. Figure S1 . Horizontal GPS tracks (5 Hz) for peregrines (blue points) attacking stationary and maneuvering targets (magenta points), to show how the line-of-sight (grayscale lines) varies through the attack. Grid lines at 10m spacing throughout. Each trajectory is plotted from 5 s before the point of intercept (see Table S1 for details of how these correspond to the simulations in Figs. 5, S2-3) . Note that the deviation angle between the line-of-sight and the bird's velocity vector is not held constant, and that whilst the geographic direction of the line-of-sight tends towards constancy in many of the trajectories, it is not necessarily held constant throughout an attack -especially during swoops against stationary targets. . GPS error analysis quantifying the accuracy and precision of position measurements made at 5 Hz using the Qstarz BT-Q1300 receivers; peregrine silhouettes to scale. (A) Raw position data from three receivers (three columns of panels) attached to a spinning playground roundabout of radius 1.5 m at a bank angle of 0˚, 45˚, or 90˚; the origin of each panel is arbitrary, but all of the data within a single panel are plotted on the same axes. The measurements do not drift by much over the course of 10 revolutions when the receiver is mounted horizontally at 0˚ (dark blue points), but their accuracy and precision become progressively more degraded as the receiver is banked from 45˚ (mid blue points) to 90˚ (dark blue points). (B-D) Comparison of groundspeed estimate computed by differencing successive GPS position estimates (blue points) with the recorded GPS Doppler measurement of groundspeed (gray circles). Note that the discrepancy between the two groundspeed estimates is small when the receiver is mounted horizontally at 0˚ (B), but becomes progressively greater as the receiver is banked from 45˚ (C) to 90˚ (D), reflecting the loss of precision seen in (A); color scheme as per panel (A). The position estimates were then compared with the onboard video, to check the consistency of the two data streams. Here, the peregrine is seen flying to the right of a tree in both data streams, as it headed towards its target (magenta point in satellite imagery). The video frame shown here was recorded at the same time as the position estimated marked in blue on the satellite imagery. The two data streams evidently match closely, thereby confirming the accuracy of this track. Most of the measured GPS trajectories coincided as closely with the onboard video as this one; those trajectories that did not coincide with the onboard video were usually far from correct, so were straightforward to identify without subjective bias. Table S2 . Detailed results of simulations assuming use of pure proportional navigation (PN) guidance against stationary (s) or maneuvering (m) targets, where is the fitted navigation constant. Each row refers to a single attack pass. Entries refer to the section of flight corresponding to the longest 2D simulation that could be fitted at 1.0% error tolerance, save that the last two columns report the longest 2D and 3D simulations that could be fitted at 0.5% and 1.2% error tolerance, respectively. The prediction error is defined as the mean absolute distance between corresponding points on the measured and simulated trajectories, expressed in units of length, or as a percentage of the distance of flight fitted. Daggers ( †) denote robustly identified outliers (28); n.s. indicates that no simulation could be fitted at the specified error tolerance. Table S3 . Results of simulations assuming use of pure proportional navigation (PN) guidance against stationary (s) and maneuvering (m) targets, where is the fitted navigation constant. Each row refers to a single attack pass. Entries headed "no added delay" refer to the section of flight corresponding to the longest 2D simulation that could be fitted at 1.0% error tolerance under nominally lag-free conditions. Entries headed "0.2s added delay" refer to the same sections of flight having introduced a delay in the line-of-sight rate equal to one GPS sample interval. The prediction error is defined as the mean absolute distance between the measured and simulated trajectories, expressed either in units of length, or as a percentage of the distance flown over the fitted section of flight. Daggers ( †) denote identified outliers (28); n.s. indicates that no simulation could be fitted at 1.0% error tolerance under nominally lag-free conditions. 
